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“[T]he tests-and-standards movement . . . ha[s] been loaded with 
a coarse utilitarian toxicity and a demeaning anti-human view of 
childhood right from the start.” 
—Jonathan Kozol1 
 
 
 
Professor of Law and Law Alumni Scholar, Boston University School of Law. I wish 
to thank Hallie Marin for helpful research assistance, and the participants in the Love or Money 
conference at Washington University School of Law for helpful discussions. 
 1. Jonathan Kozol, Standardized Testing: The Do-or-Die Agenda, PRINCIPAL, Mar./Apr. 
2006, at 18, 22. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: COMMODIFICATION IN EDUCATION REFORM 
This Essay argues that criticism of the testing movement by those 
with expertise in education, such as the renowned anti-poverty 
activist Jonathan Kozol quoted above, reference concepts and 
concerns that map remarkably well onto philosophical discussions of 
commodification as well as behavioral economics discussions of 
intrinsic motivations. This Essay explores both the similarities among 
these discourses and the possible insights that may be brought to the 
education debate from the commodification literature in philosophy 
and economics. 
The philosophy scholar Elizabeth S. Anderson argues that to value 
something differently than as a commodity is to recognize a ―special 
intrinsic worth‖ to that item.2 If it is appropriate to apply ―use‖ as the 
proper mode of valuation, then market norms are acceptable. But if a 
different mode of valuation is appropriate, such as ―love, admiration, 
honor, and appreciation,‖3 then we should not treat that item as a 
commodity.
4
 ―Use‖ as a value is simply utilitarian, while the other 
modes require a more nuanced version of value. Martha C. Nussbaum 
has written of the ―incommensurable plurality of values‖5—one item 
might be measurable in a valuation scale translatable to dollars 
(market value), while a different item is valued in terms that cannot 
enjoy a common metric with the first item (e.g., respect, love).
6
 The 
two are incommensurable: because they are valued on different 
scales, their value cannot be compared to one another. The 
commodification concern can be stated a number of ways, but it 
ordinarily contrasts the language and norms of the market with 
language, norms, and understandings that seem incompatible with the 
market.
7
 While the commodification concern has proved vulnerable 
 
 2. Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women‟s Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 
73 n.2 (1990). 
 3. Id. at 72. 
 4. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 8–11 (1993). 
 5. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND 
LITERATURE 112 (1990). 
 6. Id. at 106–24. 
 7. The commodification literature is extensive. In addition to Anderson and Nussbaum, 
see, for example, MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); HILARY 
PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY (1981); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/15
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to an array of legitimate criticism,
8
 it has proved resilient in 
describing a difficulty utilitarianism has accounting for plural values 
under some circumstances. 
This Essay looks at the movement within public education toward 
common standards and assessments represented most prominently by 
the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB).
9
 This movement is 
characterized by a drive to create common metrics in the form of test 
scores for evaluating the quality of educational programming within 
each state. This movement invites measurement based on this metric 
and invites comparisons among districts, schools, teachers, and 
students along this same scale. Writing on the standards movement is 
split between those explicating the virtues of a common metric by 
which to make comparisons, measure progress, and correct stagnation 
and those anxious that test scores have swallowed other notions of 
the good in public education. The latter concern is well summarized 
in the words of educational equity author Jonathan Kozol, ―the tests-
and-standards movement . . . ha[s] been loaded with a coarse 
utilitarian toxicity and a demeaning anti-human view of childhood 
right from the start.‖10 
In this regard, the standards-and-testing debate mimics many 
familiar concerns from the commodification debate within 
philosophy and law. But the debate over the testing movement 
represents an interesting variation because tests scores play the role 
that prices do in the commodification literature. The commodification 
debate juxtaposes market valuation with all other forms of valuation, 
while the standards and accountability debate juxtaposes the non-
market metric of test scores with more plural conceptions of 
educational purpose, quality, and outcomes.  
 
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS 
ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF 
INTIMACY (2005) [hereinafter ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY]; VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, 
PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN (1985); 
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE (Martha M. 
Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) [hereinafter RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION]. 
 8. For an early example and discussion of the critical literature, see Katharine Silbaugh, 
Commodification and Women‟s Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997).  
 9. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–110, 115 stat. 1425 (codified in 
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 10. Kozol, supra note 1, at 22. 
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The behavioral economics literature on motivations speaks to this 
cross-discipline project as well.
11
 In particular, the ―crowding out‖ 
effect may be a reason for concern in a testing-based educational 
culture. Crowding-out occurs when extrinsic motivation, particularly 
receipt of a payment, diminishes intrinsic motivations.
12
 Crowding-
out has been demonstrated even where the extrinsic motivation is 
non-monetary. This suggests potential applicability of crowding-out 
theory to student motivation to learn and school personnel motivation 
to teach where testing values dominate. For example, extrinsic 
monitoring of task completion diminishes intrinsic motivation to 
complete tasks, even though that extrinsic monitoring does not entail 
monetary rewards.
13
 This behavioral economics literature may give 
some empirical basis for a phenomenon long observed and discussed 
in the commodification literature—that a good can be changed when 
measured according to a metric that does not capture 
incommensurable modes of valuation.
14
  
Several studies have found that paying students for test score 
improvement lowers test scores below the baseline once the payment 
is withdrawn.
15
 Although these studies do not demonstrate that 
testing alone crowds-out intrinsic motivations in education because 
they evaluate payment for testing, they do indicate that there are 
vulnerable intrinsic motivations available in the school environment 
under some circumstances. Where there are intrinsic motivations, 
external monitoring of learning through standardized testing may risk 
crowding out intrinsic motivations to learn. This perverse effect 
 
 11. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
 12. Margit Osterloh, Jetta Frost & Bruno S. Frey, The Dynamics of Motivation in New 
Organizational Forms, 9 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 61, 67–68 (2002); BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST 
FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL MOTIVATION 14–15 (1997). 
 13. David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? 
The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories, 63 GAMES & ECON. 
BEHAV. 56, 57 (2008). 
 14. Part II discusses the approach in the commodification literature. 
 15. Eric P. Bettinger, Paying to Learn: The Effect of Financial Incentives on Elementary 
School Test Scores, CESIFO (Mar. 27, 2008), http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/ifo 
Content/N/neucesifo/CONFERENCES/SC_CONF_2008/ei08/Papers/ei08_Bettinger.pdf; Ellen 
Garbarino & Robert Slonim, Pay-to-Perform Educational Policy: An Experiment Examining a 
Crowding Out Effect, UC SANTA BARBARA ECON. (Mar. 2005), http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/ 
conferences/charness06/docs/slonim.pdf.  
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achieved through the transformation of motivations and values is 
described, using different language, in both the commodification 
literature within philosophy and the behavioral economics literature.  
This Essay explores the standards and assessment movement in K-
12 public education, and compares it to the commodification 
literature around market values and norms and the crowding-out 
literature. The comparison allows us to ask whether it is market 
values alone that are a problem, or instead common metrics of any 
sort. It lets us consider the insights from the commodification 
literature when evaluating the potential harms of the testing 
movement. Incommensurability—the inability to rank values—is a 
good threatened by both pricing and test scores. By positing ―testing 
as commodification,‖ this Essay seeks to raise questions for further 
investigation about the relationship between broad and pluralistic 
educational goals and values, the pressures toward measurement and 
a single metric that standardized testing establishes, crowding out, 
and the commodification literature on the corruption of value. 
II. COMMODIFICATION AS A SINGLE METRIC OF VALUE 
In his Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Oxford University, 
Michael Sandel asks us to distinguish two aspects of 
commodification critiques: those concerned about coercion and those 
concerned about corruption.
16
 When an argument is made to prohibit 
market exchanges that may exploit a financially needy person into 
selling something personally difficult to part with, such as sex or 
surrogacy, the argument is first about coercion. But the pro-market 
response is that she chooses to make a trade to improve her situation 
by her own measure, and so the idea of exploitation or coercion must 
either be better theorized with conditions for meaningful consent, or 
in the alternative, abandoned. In a perfect market, a trade cannot be 
coerced. 
 
 16. Michael J. Sandel, Prof. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral 
Limits of Markets, Lecture at Brasenose College, Oxford (May 11–12, 1998), in THE TANNER 
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 89, 94 (1998), available at http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/ 
lectures/documents/Sande100.pdf.  
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The concern about corruption, however, is not as easily answered 
with a hypothetically perfected market. Sandel explains this objection 
as follows: ―[C]ertain moral and civic goods are diminished or 
corrupted if bought and sold for money.‖17 This is because the proper 
―mode of valuation,‖ in Elizabeth Anderson’s terminology, is passed 
by in favor of the market mode of valuation. The good is corrupted, 
its value improperly assessed and acted upon, because the wrong 
mode of valuation is used (not the wrong ranking on a numeric 
metric). This theoretical contention is enhanced by the empirical one 
demonstrated in the economics literature on motivations: pay as 
―extrinsic motivation‖ can ―crowd-out,‖ meaning diminish, intrinsic 
motivation, rather than complementing it. The behavioral economics 
studies demonstrate that motivations are corrupted, meaning altered 
and degraded, by the introduction of monetary motivations. 
Anderson’s contention that modes of valuation differ immediately 
invites controversy over the proper mode of valuation for any given 
matter—controversy that’s difficult to resolve to everyone’s 
satisfaction in hard cases. When Anderson applied her idea of 
improper modes of valuation to paid surrogacy, for example, some 
questioned whether her idea of the proper alternative mode of 
valuation—emotional bonds between mother and child—are unduly 
maternalist and foreclose other potential valences of reproductive 
labor.
18
 Using language such as ―intrinsic worth‖ to describe 
reproduction invites an essentialism concern that many feminists find 
objectionable. Some have also expressed concern about an elitism in 
denying wages for the purpose of preserving meaning.
19
 In part for 
this reason, Margaret Radin argued powerfully for the importance of 
plural meanings,
20
 and Viviana Zelizer for avoiding either-or 
characterizations.
21
 The notion of worth and value need not be 
intrinsic to be robust and plural, however, and Anderson’s 
 
 17. Id.  
 18. Martha M. Ertman, What‟s Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved 
Theory of Commodification, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 7, at 303; 
Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women‟s Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 81, 104–07 (1997).  
 19. See, e.g., Silbaugh, supra note 8, at 104–07.  
 20. RADIN, supra note 7, at 103, 107 (1996). 
 21. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY, supra note 7. 
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philosophical characterizations are echoed in some economic 
literature documenting incentive effects contrary to what a rational 
actor model might suppose.
22
 
From the rich literature on commodification we might draw an 
important lesson about the corrupting influence of markets. We 
should not overstate the harms of positing that money can be a 
fruitful way to express aspects of certain social practices that have 
resisted commodification.
23
 To the contrary, expressions of market 
attributes can at times have a liberating effect on regressive and 
inegalitarian social practices.
24
 But there is a danger that market 
valuations may be so powerful that they will extinguish or 
significantly diminish alternative modes of valuation and metrics that 
could co-exist with market valuations. Radin expressed this concern 
early on using the term ―domino theory‖25 and still considers it an 
important caution.
26
 Uniformity of conception is the danger, and the 
literature on commodification conceives of uniformity in market 
terms. Market modes of valuation have trouble co-existing with other 
forms of valuation. A question worth investigating is why some 
modes of valuation would so overpower others—why market 
valuation is particularly unifying, why payment would at times 
diminish motivation instead of enhancing it. 
It is this question—how one mode of valuation threatens to so 
colonize others as to either extinguish or thoroughly transform 
them—that can be mapped onto the standards and testing movements 
that have gripped the education world for several decades. In 
undertaking to compare the two, we may see the unifying power of 
the market in a different light. In the education context we can see 
that it is not the norms and values of the market that have the power 
to extinguish other values, but it is test scores. Education and markets 
 
 22. See, e.g., RICHARD TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO 
SOCIAL POLICY (1971). 
 23. See generally Ertman, supra note 18, at 304; Martha B. Coven, The Freedom to 
Spend: The Case for Cash-Based Public Assistance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 847 (2002); Carol 
Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 67 (2007); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1575 (1996). 
 24. Ertman, supra note 18, at 305; Silbaugh, supra note 18, at 83.  
 25. RADIN, supra note 7, at 95–101. 
 26. Margaret Jane Radin & Madhavi Sunder, The Subject and Object of Commodification, 
in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 7, at 8, 17. 
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have the existence of a unitary metric in common—price for markets, 
test scores for education. Both unitary metrics use numbers, and so 
both clearly invite ranking and comparison that is difficult to achieve 
with non-monetary values such as respect, self-knowledge, or 
courage. 
While there are education scholars who argue against testing 
altogether,
27
 most critics of the standards movement believe in the 
importance of assessment to improve their teaching practice by 
looking for evidence of progress and learning. But as the standards 
and testing movement has continued to increase in force, many in the 
education world complain about its homogenizing effect.
28
 Like the 
concern about the domino effect, educators worry that increasing the 
significance of a single metric in the form of standardized test results 
is extinguishing other values in education that are important to the 
purposes of public education but that are not susceptible to that single 
metric.
29
  
The thesis of this Essay is that commodification anxiety does not 
depend on markets but rather on the unifying force of single metrics. 
What Sandel calls the ―corruption risk‖ in commodification 
discourse
30
 is robust and visible in anxieties about education reform.
31
 
Similarly, the ―crowding-out‖ effect demonstrated in the behavioral 
economics literature may be frustrating the goals of reform as 
students’ intrinsic motivation declines in the face of broad, uniform 
assessment. In this sense education reform is corrupting value in 
public education. 
 
 27. Alfie Kohn, Raising the Scores, Ruining the Schools, FAIRTEST (Dec. 19, 2007), 
http://www.fairtest.org/raising-scores-ruining-schools. 
 28. Elliot W. Eisner, Multiple Intelligences: Its Tensions and Possiblities, 106 TCHRS. C. 
REC. 31, 33–34 (2004). 
 29. Alfie Kohn, Debunking the Case for National Standards, EDUC. WK., Jan. 14, 2010, at 
28, 28; Qiuyun Lin, Beyond Standardization: Testing and Assessment in Standards-Based 
Reform, ACTION TCHR. EDUC., Winter 2002, at 43, 44–45. 
 30. Sandel, supra note 16.  
 31. Tsilly Dagan has recently made a similar point in a draft entitled ―Commodification 
Without Money,‖ in which she argues that government regulations from taxation to healthcare 
regulations employ common metrics that are reductive and flattening. Tsilly Dagan, 
Commodification Without Money (Bar-Ilan Univ. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 03-10, 2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/So13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1537586. 
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III. THE EDUCATION REFORM MOVEMENT 
In 1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Education 
published the report entitled A Nation at Risk.
32
 The report enhanced 
fears that the public education system in the United States was failing 
relative to other developed countries.
33
 From the time of its 
publication forward, standards-based reform and test-based 
accountability have been at the center of education reform debates 
and in recent years at the center of education reform practices. 
Standards-based reforms aim to redouble the academic mission in 
schools by creating content standards, aligning those with educational 
outcome measures through standardized testing, requiring teacher 
qualifications aligned with standards, and holding schools and 
teachers accountable for outcomes. Demanding content, testing to 
measure outcomes, and accountability for student achievement have 
become central to education policy. 
Of these reforms, the most visible are the outcome tests 
themselves. Reform pressures and incentives throughout the 1990s, 
culminating in the passage of NCLB, have led to the development of 
robust testing regimes in all fifty states. While each state sets its own 
content standards and develops its own assessments and cut scores to 
measure progress, the National Assessment of Educational Progress 
(NAEP) is used to ensure that states do not set their standards too 
low.
34
 Children are tested at least once each year in grades 3-8, and 
once between 10–12.35 The high school tests are ordinarily ―high-
stakes,‖ meaning students must pass them in order to receive a high 
school diploma. NCLB focuses on testing in math and language arts, 
with science assessments added only recently.
36
 
Every state sets a definition of ―proficient‖ at these subject areas 
for each grade and creates a test to assess each student’s 
 
 32. NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), available at http://datacenter.spps.org/sites/2259653e-ffb3-
45ba-8fd6-04a024ecf7a4/uploads/SOTW_A_Nation_at_Risk_1983.pdf [hereinafter A NATION 
AT RISK].  
 33. Id.   
 34. NAEP Overview, NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreport 
card/about/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).  
 35. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3)(C) (2006).  
 36. Id. § 6311(b)(1)(C).  
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proficiency.
37
 By the year 2014, NCLB requires every school in 
every state to bring every child to proficiency, as defined by that 
state.
38
 Each year between the law’s passage and the target year 2014, 
each school must make ―adequate yearly progress‖ (AYP) toward 
that proficiency goal.
39
 A school is making adequate yearly progress 
if the percentage of students whose test scores are above that line 
increases at a rate that could mathematically achieve 100 percent by 
2014, according to annual benchmarks the state has set for itself.
40
  
The law includes a series of increasingly serious sanctions for 
failure to make AYP, including the firing of staff, reorganization of 
the governance structure of a school (e.g., turning it into a charter), 
and closing the school altogether.
41
 Because the targets are ambitious, 
an increasing percentage of schools are labeled ―failing‖ each year as 
we approach 2014.
42
 In 2009, approximately a third of the nation’s 
schools were labeled ―failing,‖ and in states with high standards such 
as Massachusetts, more than half of the state’s schools are now 
failing as measured by the Act—despite that state’s comparative 
reputation for excellence in public education.
43
 It would be hard to 
overstate the significance of these developments to the culture of 
public education. 
A. Equity 
Proponents of the law focus in particular on its equity component, 
aimed at closing the achievement gap between white students and 
students of color, as well as other disadvantaged students such as 
English language learners and low-income students.
44
 To make 
adequate yearly progress, it is not enough for a school to meet the 
 
 37. Id. § 6311(b)(1)(D).  
 38. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(F).  
 39. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B).  
 40. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(A)–(C).  
 41. Id. § 6316.  
 42. Lynn Olson, As AYP Bar Rises, More Schools Fail, EDUC. WK., Sept. 20, 2006, at 1.  
 43. CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, HOW MANY SCHOOLS AND DISTRICTS HAVE NOT MADE 
ADEQUATE YEARLY PROGRESS? FOUR-YEAR TRENDS 9 (2010), available at http://www.cep-dc. 
org/index.cfm?DocumentSubSubTopicID=8.  
 44. NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE REDUCTION OF THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP: 
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL EDUCATIONAL POLICY (Alan R. Sadovnik et al. 
eds., 2007).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/15
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increasing percentage targets for its student body as a whole. The law 
requires schools to report test outcomes by a number of subgroups, 
including race, special education, limited English proficiency, and 
low-income classifications.
45
 The school must bring each sub-group 
to the annual benchmark percentage.
46
 
This equity component means that a school cannot make adequate 
yearly progress by increasing the percentage of typically-developing 
middle income white students who reach proficiency at a sufficient 
rate to compensate for stagnating percentages of English language 
learners, low income students, special needs students, or racial 
minorities. This provision of the law requires schools to focus on 
closing the traditional achievement gaps among these groups. NCLB 
is thus widely understood to contain laudable equity goals intended to 
focus schools on improving the performance of student sub-groups 
that have been ―left behind‖ in the U.S. education system. Many 
reformers have observed that the United States education system is 
already adequate in many suburban districts, and the most appalling 
schools are almost exclusively attended by students with little social 
capital, particularly in urban school systems.
47
 But even in suburban 
schools, the achievement gap by race persists, and NCLB prevents 
such schools from self-congratulatory assessments about the 
achievement of its white students if its African American students, 
for example, are not also increasing their movement toward 100 
percent proficiency. 
The irony of this equity component of NCLB, however, is clear to 
those who study high-poverty districts. It is upon those students in 
particular—the ones historically so badly underserved by public 
education—that the most negative corrupting effects of the standards 
movement fall. While suburban schools are likely to retain music, art, 
critical thinking, research papers and other project-based work 
because they can do so and still achieve AYP, poorer districts have 
been reduced to ―drill-and-kill‖ test prep to the exclusion of other 
 
 45. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(II).  
 46. Id. § 6493.  
 47. See JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF 
APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (2005). 
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aspects of teaching that are not susceptible to clear measurement.
48
 
The flattening effect on curriculum and content is not evenly 
distributed but falls most heavily on those groups historically 
disadvantaged in our education system. Because the standards 
movement does not aim to close the achievement gap by evening 
resources among wealthier and poorer districts, the decisions made in 
poorer districts must be different than those made in wealthier 
districts, and the poorer districts are therefore more sensitive to the 
negative effects of teaching to the test. 
B. Metrics and Commensurability as Translation Between Educators 
and Policymakers or Parents 
The achievement goals of NCLB were set in the political arena, 
not by schools or educators. This was the point: those who are 
politically accountable felt that schools needed external motivation, 
in the form of accountability, to deliver great education. As critics of 
the law have pointed out, the achievement goals were not set in 
relation to an assessment of what schools have the capacity to 
achieve
49
 but in relation to election cycles and other exogenous 
pressures. 
Most followers of the education reform movement would have to 
acknowledge a strand of distrust between policymakers and 
educators.
50
 Crudely characterized, many policymakers believe 
schools need external pressure—carrots and sticks—to do better. 
School personnel, crudely characterized, believe that policymakers 
are mandating performance from schools that includes curing social 
ills not within a school’s power to control—like mandating an end to 
poverty itself. Further, many school personnel feel that policymakers 
are forcing them to eliminate valuable educational materials that are 
 
 48. See id.; Monty Neill, A Child Is Not a Test Score: Assessment as a Civil Rights Issue, 
ROOT & BRANCH, Fall 2009, at 28, available at http://www.fairtest.org/files/root%20&% 
20branch%20fall%20-%20MN%20testing%20only.pdf. 
 49. Richard F. Elmore, The Problem of Capacity in the (Re)Design of Educational 
Accountability Systems, in NCLB AT THE CROSSROADS: REEXAMINING THE FEDERAL EFFORT 
TO CLOSE THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 230, 230 (Michael A. Rebell & Jessica R. Wolff eds., 2009).  
 50. See Steven Brill, The Rubber Room, NEW YORKER, Aug. 31, 2009, at 30.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/15
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not on the test.
51
 Surely many policymakers engaged in education 
reform view teachers and administrators as sincere and motivated. 
But other policymakers whose theory of motivation is tied to 
markets, particularly in the political arena, believe that schools have a 
motivation issue because they are not subject to market demands.
52
 
Ideas about motivation are an important part of the reform 
movement. 
The cultural differences between schools and policy makers are 
substantial. The story of motivation told in the market arena may be 
confounded in the schools culture. For example, in response to a 
survey asking whether they would want merit pay for improved test 
scores, fewer than 17.23 percent of teachers somewhat or strongly 
favored merit pay, while 60 percent strongly opposed.
53
 This result 
suggests an enormous number of potential ―winners‖ in such a 
system (those who would benefit from higher pay) do not want a 
valuation system that reflects their achievement on that metric. By 
contrast, 72 percent of teachers surveyed favored a pay bonus for 
teaching in ―a high-priority situation (e.g., in an inner-city school),‖ a 
concept often given the unfortunate name ―combat pay.‖54 If we 
decide to tell a simple economic story of motivation about these 
numbers (that working conditions are being traded for wages), we 
miss a potential insight into the intrinsic motivations of educators and 
the alternative (non-market) values in the schools culture. 
If politicians and some policymakers like testing because it fits a 
market-based story of motivation, parents and some policymakers 
may lend their political support to testing for a different reason. The 
common metric of testing appears to be designed in part to let non-
educators see a ranking or assessment that is otherwise inscrutable to 
them because they are not qualified as educators to evaluate school 
 
 51. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.   
 52. See Steven Brill, The Teachers‟ Unions‟ Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2010, § 6 
(Magazine), at MM32, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/magazine/23Race-
t.html?pagewanted=Id_rl.  
 53. Dan Goldhaber, Michael DeArmond & Scott DeBurgomaster, Teacher Attitudes 
About Compensation Reform: Implications for Reform Implementation 9–10 (Ctr. on 
Reinventing Pub. Educ., Working Paper No. 20, 2007), available at http://www.crpe.org/cs/ 
crpe/download/csr_files/wp_sfrp20_goldhaber_aug07.pdf. 
 54. Id.  
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quality. It is a translation device between school and non-school 
cultures. Just as an economist might admit that rational 
acquisitiveness does not represent the truth of social life
55
 but rather 
is a theoretical system that by simplification allows prediction,
56
 
standards proponents know that education is not summed up by test 
results but that the simplification of education through test results 
permits important prediction and discussion by non-educators. 
Commensurability—the possibility of comparison—is the virtue 
sought by those without enough expertise to make qualitative 
judgments along non-standard metrics. So policymakers are seeking 
simplicity to bridge the gap between themselves and educators. If 
they seek transformation, it is transformation up the scale of the 
metric. The insights from the commodification and behavioral 
economics literatures might suggest that a metric of measurement and 
monitoring will have unintended transformative effects other than 
movement up that scale. 
Some policymakers see the problem in schools as one of 
compliance with expectations and are strategic in pressuring schools 
with the threat of sanctions.
57
 School personalities tend to be less 
strategic and approach mandates sincerely so long as there is the 
capacity to achieve them.
58
 But when there is not capacity, either 
because the institution and its personnel lack necessary skills and 
information or because the goal is impossible, the response of schools 
can be counter-productive.
59
 Critics of NCLB in particular and the 
standards movement more generally point to these negative 
influences that standards have within schools.
60
 
The part of the reform movement that is our concern is in part a 
battle over the theory of motivation in schools. This is particularly 
visible in the political arena where schools are debated through the 
lens of attitudes toward government services and toward unions. But 
 
 55. See generally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT 
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008).  
 56. See generally JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN 
CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM 53–55 (1990). 
 57. Elmore, supra note 49, at 230–31. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.  
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the second strand in the testing movement, the one that translates 
something about educational quality to non-education experts such as 
parents, provides political support for the education reform 
movement and may explain its success. It is understandable that a 
single metric of comparison is attractive to people like parents, with 
great reason to care about educational quality but without the 
expertise to know what high quality means. The two reasons for a 
common metric—translation and motivation—converge in the testing 
regime. 
IV. HOW TESTS CHANGE SCHOOLS:  
WHAT IS ―TEACHING TO THE TEST‖? 
The range of criticisms about school responses to the standards 
movement may be summed up in the frequent complaint that schools 
are now ―teaching to the test.‖61 This is an interesting complaint, 
because the creation of standards and assessments (tests) to check 
achievement of those standards is in a sense a direct call to teach to 
the test. Schools are expected to focus their efforts on teaching 
students the content and skills mandated by the standards movement, 
with the knowledge that success in teaching those skills is determined 
by test performance. Teaching the materials for the test is the goal. 
Therefore, to evaluate this criticism of testing, we need a fuller 
picture of its purported harms. 
Certainly schools divert some energy to teaching test-taking skills 
that may not be content-oriented, such as how to eliminate options 
when evaluating a multiple choice question. Almost every public 
school now does some of this, and this is relatively easy to label 
wasted time.
62
 But when schools are not teaching test-taking skills, 
the accountability strand of the testing movement seeks to have 
teachers teach to the test, at least for the substance. In theory, as long 
as the test is ―good,‖ meaning an accurate measure of whether 
 
 61. See, e.g., How Standardized Testing Damages Education, FAIRTEST (Aug. 20, 2007), 
http://www.fairtest.org/facts/howharm.htm; Teaching to the Test, BUS.-MANAGED DEMOCRACY, 
http://herinst.org/BusinessManagedDemocracy/education/curricula/teachtest.html (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2011).  
 62. Teaching to the Test, supra note 61.  
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students learned what we think they needed to learn, testing 
advocates can argue that there is little harm in teaching to the test. 
A. Narrowing the Curriculum 
Yet there is solid evidence that the curriculum in schools across 
the country is narrowing to align with whatever content is being 
tested and that many schools, children, and parents are unhappy about 
this development.
63
 Reports of schools cutting recess, art, and music 
are routine, and even cuts to social studies are too common.
64
 One 
can immediately see the conflict in values between those who sought 
a narrowing of focus to the core reading and math skills and those 
who see the goals of education more broadly. 
Reports of narrowed curricula are widespread. From books with 
provocative titles like What Happened to Recess and Why Are Our 
Children Struggling in Kindergarten?
65
 to government statistics 
showing an increase in time spent on language arts and math and a 
decrease in time spent on science and social studies,
66
 the consensus 
is that schools across the country have adapted their curricula to 
focus on subjects that are tested by reducing the time spent on 
subjects that are not a part of the testing program, such as social 
studies, and ones that are not susceptible to standardized testing at all, 
such as music, art, and physical education.
67
 Newspapers report on 
 
 63. See Wayne Au, High-Stakes Testing and Curricular Control: A Qualitative 
Metasynthesis, 36 EDUC. RESEARCHER 258, 259 (2007), available at http://www.aera.net/up 
loadedFiles/Publications/Journals/Educational_Researcher/3605/07EDR07_258-267.pdf (study 
finding curriculum narrowing as a result of high-stakes testing); Brian M. Stecher, 
Consequences of Large-Scale, High-Stakes Testing on School and Classroom Practice, in 
MAKING SENSE OF TEST-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY IN EDUCATION 79, 91–94 (Laura S. 
Hamilton, Brain M. Stecher & Stephn P. Klein eds., 2002), available at http://www.rand.org/ 
pubs/monograph_reports/MR1554/MR1554.ch4.pdf (describing phenomenon of ―Negative 
Curriculum Reallocation‖).  
 64. Alfie Kohn, Editorial, Emphasis on Testing Leads to Sacrifices in Other Areas, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 21, 2001), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/2001-08-22-ncguest1.htm. 
 65. SUSAN OHANIAN, WHAT HAPPENED TO RECESS AND WHY ARE OUR CHILDREN 
STRUGGLING IN KINDERGARTEN? (2002) (an anti-testing manifesto). 
 66. Beth A. Morton & Ben Dalton, Changes in Instructional Hours in Four Subjects by 
Public School Teachers of Grades 1 Through 4, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., 4 (May 2002), 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007305.pdf. 
 67. Claus von Zastrow with Helen Jane, Academic Atrophy: The Condition of the Liberal 
Arts in America‟s Public Schools, COUNCIL FOR BASIC EDUC., 7 (Mar. 2004), http://www.menc. 
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the trend
68
 as educators wring their hands over the trade-offs they are 
pressed to make. 
Here we find an analogy to the commodification literature. One 
set of values are measurable, are measured, and can be made 
commensurable, and another set of values are not or cannot be placed 
on a metric. Rather than simply describing the world, this 
phenomenon places pressure to re-design the world so that we place 
our energies behind only what is measured. Here the need to make 
items commensurable leads to a worse result than a simple failure to 
describe the character of the good in question (education) by placing 
that good on a common metric. It actually transforms the character of 
the item. The description is self-fulfilling: education becomes the 
thing we have tools to measure about education. 
In the context of education, it is difficult to argue that this 
commensurability has not corrupted the character of the item, 
because what schools do has changed since we began forcing schools 
to measure and compare along a common metric. We have 
diminished social skills development, character and self-discovery, 
research skills, physical education, creative endeavors from art and 
music to theater and even creative writing, science instruction, and 
the understanding of diverse social organizations conveyed in social 
studies.  
Is this a loss? Good test performance does not appear to generalize 
outside of the tests themselves to these areas
69—teaching good test 
 
org/documents/legislative/AcademicAtrophy.pdf (finding increased instruction in reading, 
math, and science and decreased instruction in the arts, especially in high minority districts); 
Jennifer McMurrer, Choices, Changes, and Challenges: Curriculum and Instruction in the 
NCLB Era, CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, 1 (Dec. 2007), http://www.cep-dc.org/index.cfm?fuseaction 
=document.showDocumentByID&nodeID=1&DocumentID=212 (reporting an increase in 
reading and math instruction and a decrease in other areas). While physical fitness is 
periodically subject to assessment under national or statewide programs, these are in the nature 
of health screenings, because fitness itself is not the direct learning objective of physical 
education but rather the acquisition of skills and knowledge toward the development of active 
and healthy lifestyles. See, e.g., CAL. ST. BD. OF EDUC., Physical Education Model Content 
Standards for California Public Schools: Kindergarten through Grade Twelve, at vi (2006), 
available at http://www.cde.ca.gov/be/st/ss/documents/pestandards.pdf.  
 68. See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Schools Cut Back Subjects to Push Reading and Math, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, § 1, at 21. 
 69. Daniel M. Koretz et al., The Effects of High-Stakes Testing on Achievement: 
Preliminary Findings About Generalization Across Tests, EDUC. RESOURCES INFO. CTR., 20–21 
(Apr. 5, 1991), http://www.eric.ed.gov:80/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/ 
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performance does not lead to the successful teaching of many valued 
and useful subjects and skills. The character of education has been 
transformed by the common metric. The goals of education are now 
contained by the limits of our ability to measure, rank, and compare, 
not by the limits of our values for education.
70
  
B. “Testing Gains, Not Learning Gains”71 
A different harm from teaching to the test arises because the tests, 
to be administrable across a large population, must be simplified for 
the sake of uniformity. Any good educator needs to assess regularly 
what her students are learning. Those who object to the education 
reform movement still acknowledge the importance of some 
assessment to understand what gains students are making. But the 
current assessments are a tail that wags the dog of educational 
decision making, because the consequences of disappointing 
outcomes are so severe and because the metric is universal regardless 
of school structure, goals, philosophy, resources, and population. The 
accountability provisions are having their intended effect: they are 
getting schools to drop everything and focus on a few uniform 
measures. The tests are not helpful servants of a school curriculum 
designed to accomplish many goals. Instead, they become the goal. 
This places greater confidence in the test validity of any one 
instrument than even test-makers and proponents would claim. 
If instead schools were using multiple sources of evidence of 
learning, each appropriate to one hoped for gain, they might produce 
a more sophisticated sense of whether they are making gains along all 
the measures that are hoped for. Prior to the standards movement, 
schools traditionally used many forms of assessment in that way, by 
looking at portfolio work, verbal assessment, or instruments intended 
 
0000019b/80/23/82/30.pdf (concluding that performance on tests does not generalize more 
broadly and that teachers focus on content specific to test). 
 70. See David L. Berliner, MCLB (Much Curriculum Left Behind): A U.S. Calamity in the 
Making, 73 EDUC. F. 284, 294–95 (2009); Charles Rooney with Bob Schaeffer, Test Scores Do 
Not Equal Merit: Enhancing Equity & Excellence in College Admissions by Deemphasizing 
SAT and ACT Results, FAIRTEST (Sept. 1998), http://www.fairtest.org/files/optrept.pdf. 
 71. JONATHAN KOZOL, LETTERS TO A YOUNG TEACHER 120 (2007); see also Koretz et al., 
supra note 69, at 1.  
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to measure very specific and localized learning gains such as content 
knowledge associated with a science project. By combining a range 
of assessments, schools could evaluate whether they were achieving 
gains in student learning defined a number of different ways and tied 
directly to curriculum units.
72
 But in today’s high stakes testing 
world, success has one measure: the statewide annual uniform test. 
Like an economic market that allows us to compare numbered prices 
as full representatives of value, numbered test scores are on a path to 
becoming the full representatives of value in education. 
C. Corrupted Schools 
In the commodification literature, markets corrupt values by 
changing the character of goods and extinguishing non-market 
valuations.
73
 In the behavioral economics literature, external rewards 
and metrics change human motivation by diminishing intrinsic 
motivation. But in education, a most old-fashioned variety of 
corruption has shown up with disturbing regularity as individual 
teachers, and sometimes entire schools, cheat or assist their students 
in cheating on standardized tests.
74
 This gives a different and more 
literal spin to the idea of corruption in the commodification and 
behavioral economic literatures. Teacher cheating reflects the 
intensity of the disconnection between school personnel and the 
standards advocates.  
An increasing number of schools have been judged ―failing‖ 
under the new standards regime, and climbing up the metric of test 
scores by any means attracts some school personnel to a deep 
betrayal of educational values. Imagine the cynicism toward 
education experienced by a student whose teacher assists her in 
cheating on a test, and you can see the three versions of corruption 
converge. 
 
 72. Surely with multiple assessments of different varieties it is more difficult to hold 
schools accountable for uniform standards. A trade-off has occurred among goods and values 
rather than a climb up a common vision of quality. 
 73. See generally RADIN, supra note 7; RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 7.  
 74. Kris Axtman, When Tests‟ Cheaters Are the Teachers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 
11, 2005), http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0111/p01s03-ussc.html; Shaila Dewan, Georgia 
Schools Inquiry Finds Signs of Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2010, at A14. 
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But corruption takes a less literal form in schools as well, one 
closer to the description Michael Sandel elaborates—degradation of 
goods by diminishment of non-market modes of valuation.
75
 We have 
seen the way curriculum content is narrowed to meet the uniform 
metrics, such that science and social studies take a back seat to math 
and language arts.
76
 But the skills portion of education is similarly 
narrowed to that which can be assessed on a statewide test. Many 
tests have an open response component, but because every student in 
every state must take the test, a large portion is multiple choice. This 
makes it difficult to demonstrate thinking skills, much less creativity. 
Testing proponents may view this as just a difficulty of instrument 
design. But in the case of thinking and creativity skills, testing might 
look for what’s inherently uniform in attributes valued in part 
because they are individual and incomparable in some ways. How 
can educators genuinely value what’s incommensurable in these 
skills in a regime that defines value in ranked comparison to others? 
Consider the value students derive from the experience of 
performing in a play, and then ask what of that value we can measure 
in a way that allows us to conclude that one set of students attained 
more of ―it‖ than another. Public speaking confidence? Appreciation 
of others by embodying a role? Teamwork? Tackling uncomfortable 
tasks? Most educators, and probably many non-educators, believe 
that these skills and experiences have educational value, but that 
belief itself is threatened by the inability to make uniform 
assessments in our current standardizing system. It is not simply that 
the values at stake are not susceptible to measurement, though that 
may be true. It is that uniformity is not exactly a desired outcome—if 
the skills at stake could be measured and compared, we would be 
assuming more is better along a single line. That is how the argument 
from incommensurability meets the argument from corruption: 
incommensurability of value should not mean there is no value, but 
the practice of commensurability/comparison corrupts education such 
that we no longer value what we cannot measure and also what we 
cannot compare. This is what Kozol calls the ―demeaning anti-human 
 
 75. Sandel, supra note 16, at 94.  
 76. See supra Part IV.A. 
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view of childhood‖77 that utilitarianism in education implies: it’s an 
anti-human system if it fails to give meaningful energy to the 
development of attributes whose value is wrapped up in their 
incomparability. 
Student discovery of content instead of being handed content 
similarly develops important life skills. Discovery is what happens 
when the learning process includes time for children and adults alike 
to experiment and find information. A rushed curriculum, on the 
other hand, asks us to more efficiently deliver information—to spoon 
feed what ought to be discovered. This may improve test scores 
without improving retention. More importantly, children fail to learn 
the skill of discovery. Many educators have pointed out that 
attainment of the knowledge to achieve on standardized tests in 
public K-12 schooling today has not been validated to attainment of 
anything in particular that a young adult might need.
78
 The ability to 
find or discover information seems more adapted to a changing and 
unpredictable future than the information itself. This is why anti-test 
leader Alfie Kohn argues that improved test scores are ruining 
schools.
79
 
Examples of educational values that are in a similar, untestable 
zone are easy to find. Schools cannot test team-building behavior, 
problem-solving, attitude, adaptability, motivation, curiosity, 
situation sense, flexibility, leadership, ethics, open-mindedness, 
patience, compromise, conflict-resolution, or self-expression. But 
many agree that children need to develop these capacities to be 
happy, good, and successful individuals, citizens, and workers in 
their adult lives.
80
 That we cannot place those values onto the central 
metric for measurement diminishes their importance to educational 
culture today, and the ―market‖ becomes flat, the character of the 
item corrupted, and genuine value is lost. If the question, ―What does 
 
 77. Kozol, supra note 1, at 22.  
 78. Larry Cuban, Why Bad Reforms Won‟t Give Us Good Schools, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 1, 
2001), http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=why_bad_reforms_wont_give_us_good_ 
schools; Koretz et al., supra note 69, at 1 (concluding that performance on tests does not 
generalize more broadly and that teachers focus on content specific to test). 
 79. Kohn, supra note 27.  
 80. Jonathan Kozol, The Details of Life, THE NATION, May 22, 2000, at 15, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/article/details-life; Berliner, supra note 70, at 290–91.  
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a child need to become a fulfilled adult?‖ were the same as the 
question, ―What makes a good education?,‖ education would look 
different from today’s standards and benchmarks-based institution. 
This might explain in part the suddenly common newspaper or 
magazine article that asks whether education is still relevant to 
success in life.
81
 
These observations beg a number of questions. What are the 
proper goals for public education, which values among those goals 
are being compromised, and why? Additionally, what do markets and 
testing have in common that make them such powerful modes of 
valuation such that they seem to threaten other modes of valuation so 
easily? The next two sections take up these concerns in turn. 
V. THE HISTORY OF PLURALISM IN EDUCATION: DOES QUALITY 
EDUCATION MEAN UNIFORM EDUCATION? 
Throughout the history of public education in the United States, 
there has not been consensus around a single goal for the institution. 
Rather, a variety of goals and purposes have been held out as 
justifications for public education. It was Jefferson’s ideal that public 
schools were necessary to prepare citizens to effectively participate in 
the new democratic form of government by creating literacy, 
deliberation, and reasoning skills that would inform voting and 
prepare some in the newly classless society to run for office.
82
 
Other justifications that have fueled the institutionalization of 
state-funded education in the United States have included resolving 
cultural conflict that arises in a diverse society of immigrants through 
shared experience across family and ethnic backgrounds. Education 
was promoted by earlier arrivals as a way to create a common 
American identity with later arrivals. Public education is also 
supposed to prepare workers to serve the economy and prepare 
workers to improve their own standing in the idealized classless 
 
 81. See, e.g., Rebecca Mead, Learning by Degrees, NEW YORKER, June 7, 2010, at 21. 
 82. CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN 
SOCIETY, 1780–1860, at 6 (1983). 
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society. It has been charged with promoting social order, industrious 
habits, and intelligent citizenship.
83
 
At many points in American history, education has been offered 
as the basis for a theoretically classless society where individuals can 
compete for wealth based on skills and abilities cultivated on an 
equal playing field, and the equality ideals embedded in the 
American form of government have been thought to depend on the 
availability of free, adequate public education for all children.
84
 
Important to this Essay, no one single justification and purpose for 
public education has triumphed in either the education or the political 
discourse. Rather, multiple purposes have co-existed as schools grew 
out of local communities with only loose oversight at the state level 
and almost no guidance at the federal level. Pluralism and community 
have been at the heart of public education, and localism managed 
particularized community values and goals, preventing the 
dominance of a singular vision for education.
85
 
This is not a claim that any ideal has been achieved in the public 
education system now or in the past. Indeed, the education system 
has notoriously failed low-income rural and urban children, 
immigrants, and children of color in particular.
86
 But requiring 
identical output from schools with vastly different resources, 
challenges, and cultures does not improve on that problem. Rather, 
the problems of inequality in school resources and challenges are 
minimized by an expectation of equal output on a testing metric. 
Some critics of testing focus on unintended consequences such as 
cheating and compromised curricula.
87
 But other critiques of 
standardized testing reject the concept of measurement more 
thoroughly.
88
 For example, a recent article criticizing the standards 
 
 83. Id. at 7–8, 75–83. 
 84. Of course this is not a claim that public education has produced a classless society and 
social mobility. My commentator Kieran Healy focuses in part on the role that education plays 
in the social justification for unequal opportunities and on education as an authoritative system 
and relates testing to that function. I have no particular objection to his comments in this regard. 
 85. KAESTLE, supra note 82, passim. 
 86. Sarah Deschenes, Larry Cuban & David Tyack, Mismatch: Historical Perspectives on 
Schools and Students Who Don‟t Fit Them, 103 TCHRS. L. REC. 525, 530–31 (2001).  
 87. See Axtman, supra note 74; Berliner, supra note 70, at 294–95.  
 88. See Kohn, supra note 27.  
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movement is poignantly titled A Child Is Not a Test Score,
89
 using the 
kind of language that has so concerned market commodification 
critics like Elizabeth Anderson in other contexts when price is 
substituted for test score.  
These perspectives speak to the lack of consensus on the purposes 
of public education. The genius, though, of American public 
education has been its ability to withstand this lack of consensus and 
to thrive in the notion of pluralism. The uniformity of the 
standardized test movement threatens this pluralism of purpose with a 
top-down set of purposes selected from among the many. Public 
education has always failed its ideals in many respects. But at 
different times and in different places the multiplicity of ideals has 
shaped pluralistic educational agendas, failure to achieve success 
with many of those agendas notwithstanding. The testing trend takes 
multiple values that have co-existed and reduces them to the one 
value, which even in its best light can only be expressed as 
competence in math, reading, and writing, without reference to other 
necessary skills for a fulfilling life or citizenship. Not only is this a 
flat choice among the numerous values public education serves, it 
fails to reach the citizenship values that have long helped to justify 
the public investment in free education. 
VI. COMMON POWER IN THE TWO METRICS:  
MONEY AND TEST SCORES 
Testing does not map perfectly onto literal markets, and we could 
surely spend time drawing out differences. But the similarities can be 
uncanny. My question is what the lessons of the comparison might 
be. Several occur as possibilities. If alternative values are just that—
values—why can’t they stand up to market norms or testing norms? 
Why do markets (tests) extinguish plural conceptions of personhood 
(education)? I offer two possible answers. The first asks whether the 
power lies in numerosity itself: rank orderings cascade inevitably 
toward flattening values. The second asks whether the standards 
movement in schools is linked more literally to economic markets. 
 
 89. Neill, supra note 48, at 28.  
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A. Numerosity 
Does the power to deflate and flatten plural values stem from the 
ability to compare along a single metric? We might call a person 
adventurous and another loyal, recognize that these are different 
values, struggle to compare them, but in the end recognize that they 
will not be pressed into an agreeable ordering. But when numeric 
values are at play, the ordering comes naturally. Perhaps the 
overpowering ethics of markets and testing arise from numerosity. 
This point is reflected somewhat in the opening quotation by 
Jonathan Kozol pointing to the de-humanizing utilitarianism reflected 
in tests. Uniformity for comparison purposes binds together 
money/markets and scores/schools.
90
 Incommensurability relies on 
metrics that cannot standardize, and if incommensurability is 
necessary to the maintenance of plural values, then testing and 
markets cannot maintain plural values. 
The literature on crowding-out intrinsic motivations with extrinsic 
ones suggests that context matters. Sometimes extrinsic pay is highly 
effective. Perhaps there are not robust intrinsic motivations to be 
displaced, for example, when pay is used to motivate behavior in 
certain contexts. Sometimes one metric of value is enough. In other 
contexts, it matters greatly. Although there does not yet seem to be 
extensive work in the behavioral economics literature on the impact 
of standardized testing on intrinsic motivations, related and relevant 
study is sobering. There have been several experiments with paying 
students for higher test scores. The findings vary somewhat but 
generally point to either no or small increases in test scores, followed 
by decline to levels worse than before the incentives were introduced 
when the extrinsic pay is removed.
91
 These studies do not 
demonstrate that testing without pay leads to crowding-out, but they 
do suggest that there are intrinsic motivations in place in the 
educational setting capable of being crowded-out such that the theory 
of crowding out of motivations disrupts a standard carrot-and-stick 
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model of motivation in schools. More than one set of values drive 
schools. 
If the schools context is full of incommensurable motivating 
values, if education has robust ―plural meanings‖ in Radin’s 
terminology, the rankings associated with a single metric may do 
more damage to education than they do to typical market 
commodities. Numerosity may flatten out more incommensurable 
values when there are more to flatten. If education is such a good, 
than the single numeric scores from tests can behave like prices in the 
area of other goods with robust plural meanings, such as reproductive 
labor, friendship, housing, or sex.
92
 These goods with plural 
meanings suffer when prices purport to exhaust their value.
93
 If the 
harm of pricing derives in large part from the numeric ranking itself, 
testing should do the same to education. 
B. Creation of Workers 
A different possibility is that markets as we understand them 
conventionally are embedded in the standards movement. That is, the 
uniformity of purpose occurs because it relates to a particular market-
based idea about the purpose of public education, which is workforce 
readiness.
94
 In a non-uniform system of schooling, multiple 
conceptions of the purposes of public education have co-existed, 
sometimes within one school, and sometimes across different schools 
and school systems. That is, the original explanation for U.S. public 
schooling, the Jeffersonian conception that self-government 
depended on an educated electorate, is a citizenship-based rationale 
for public schools. Many schools in the United States have embraced 
that purpose, with preparation for citizenship an explicit goal that 
also pervades the curriculum. But schools are also, and have long 
been, purposed with improving the economic prospects of 
individuals, thus, in theory, de-classing the society. This posits a 
market-based reason for public education that serves the students; 
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education gives individuals the opportunity to achieve upward class 
mobility in the economy. But the nebulous concept of ―the economy‖ 
itself is also served by a prepared workforce, and fears of 
international competition for the best-educated workforce, while long 
present, seem to have increased in pitch. Perhaps the similarity 
between the commodification literature and the standards movement 
in public education exposes the increasingly tight nexus between 
markets and public education. 
Consider the school choice movement, which is tightly linked to 
the broader standards movement. The school choice movement seeks 
to harness explicitly market-based mechanisms of comparison 
shopping by parents in an effort to improve the quality of schools by 
making them work to retain their students.
95
 Parents are expected to 
vote with their feet by comparing test scores among schools. That 
school choice has not worked particularly well—parents want to 
preserve their school communities rather than shop among them—
suggests that parents themselves want schools to serve a broader 
purpose for their child than the production of improved test scores.
96
 
But the choice movement suggests a link in the minds of education 
reformers between uniform tests and markets. 
In response to this explanation—that markets and standardized 
testing may have a closer link than numerosity alone—we might ask 
how the elimination of critical thinking, team-building, or self-
awareness, for example, could possibly serve the economy. I have no 
ready answer to this question, and would note that the paradox may 
explain some of the recent hand-wringing over whether education 
still has value.
97
 But perhaps the short-hand of comparing workers 
that only homogeneity of metrics can deliver may explain why some 
skills are worth giving up in exchange for the ability to order 
potential workers. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The comparison between the testing movement and the 
commodification literature is not perfect, because commodification is 
used to describe a process of putting something into the market for 
exchange at a price. But they have in common being counted, 
measured, and compared along a single metric and being subject to 
the related process of flattening or thinning out whatever values 
cannot be reconciled with the numbered and ranked system. From the 
comparison we draw cautionary notes for the testing movement, areas 
for further research about motivation in behavioral science, and 
translation of a philosophical debate into practical policy. 
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/15
